Entrepreneurial Financing—Alternatives for Raising Capital by Broude, Paul & Levangie, Joseph E.
New England Journal of
Entrepreneurship
Volume 9 | Number 2 Article 8
2006
Entrepreneurial Financing—Alternatives for
Raising Capital
Paul Broude
Foley & Lardner LLP, Pbroude@foley.com
Joseph E. Levangie
Ardour Capital, LLC
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons, and the Finance and
Financial Management Commons
This From the Practitioner's Corner is brought to you for free and open access by the Jack Welch College of Business at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of Entrepreneurship by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information,
please contact ferribyp@sacredheart.edu, lysobeyb@sacredheart.edu.
Recommended Citation
Broude, Paul and Levangie, Joseph E. (2006) "Entrepreneurial Financing—Alternatives for Raising Capital," New England Journal of
Entrepreneurship: Vol. 9 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol9/iss2/8
Entrepreneurial Financing—Alternatives for Raising Capital
Cover Page Footnote
From the “Practitioner’s Corner”
This from the practitioner's corner is available in New England Journal of Entrepreneurship: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/
neje/vol9/iss2/8
Most entrepreneurs are continually concernedabout their finances. Their companies perhapsnot yet profitable, they may have a fear of “run-
ning out of dry powder.” These entrepreneurs often have
fallen in love with their company’s technologies, products,
and potential markets, but they require more resources.
Invariably these emerging ventures shroud their fear of the
grueling capital raising marathon by presenting volumi-
nous business plans to potential investors. They often
flaunt their “optimized business models.” Investors, how-
ever, typically want to know why the potential investment
is such a good deal.The entrepreneur often wants guidance
regarding what to say to whom in a changing financing
environment.
In this article, our “Practitioner’s Corner” associate edi-
tor Joe Levangie collaborates with a long-time colleague
Paul Broude to address how businesses should “make their
capital-raising initiatives happen.” Levangie, a venture
advisor and entrepreneur, first worked with Broude, a busi-
ness and securities attorney, in 1985 when they went to
London to pursue financing for an American startup.They
successfully survived all-night drafting sessions, late-night
clubbing by the company founder, and even skeet shooting
and barbequing at the investment banker’s country house
to achieve the first “Greenfield” flotation by an American
company on the Unlisted Securities Market of the London
Stock Exchange. To ascertain how the entrepreneur can
determine what financing options exist in today’s invest-
ing climate, read on.
We start with a quiz:
January 26, 1983, a date that forever altered how startup
companies went about the grueling process of raising capi-
tal.Was it:
A. A spectacular rise or fall in the prices of NASDAQ
stocks? 
B. A dramatic change in securities laws governing the sale
of stock? 
C. A seismic shift in the Federal Reserve Board’s interest
rate policy?
The answer is “D, None of the Above.” January 26, 1983,
was the day Lotus Development Corporation released its first
version of Lotus 1-2-3®, encouraging would-be entrepre-
neurs everywhere to create 50-page spreadsheets that fore-
cast the successful growth of their fledgling enterprises.The
process of obfuscation was set in motion: too much data with
too little meaning.Worse yet,entrepreneurs started to believe
that these spreadsheets were the “truth!”
Keeping It Simple
Fast-forward to 2006: The numbers still count, but
today’s entrepreneurs need to have more—and less—
than an extensive Excel® spreadsheet to raise capital.
Across all types of financing—and we’ll examine current
trends in various capital markets—businessowners seek-
ing capital need to focus on three core questions that
define the business opportunity.
1.What is the problem the entrepreneur is trying to solve?
2.What is the company’s solution to the problem?
3.Who is the buyer for the company’s product or service?
The concept of an “elevator pitch” is a bit of a cliché, but
in reality it has become very difficult for companies to raise
capital unless management can concisely identify—generally
in five minutes or less—the market opportunity, its solution,
and its customers. Most financing sources are less interested
initially in seeing a 50-page business plan with full-blown
financial projections than in a PowerPoint® slide deck that
succinctly lays out why customers need the company’s new
product.
The entrepreneur should try to think about these three
core questions in their most basic terms—the more easily the
product advantages can be explained to potential customers,
the easier they will be to explain to investors, and the more
likely it is that these money people will grasp the opportuni-
ty. Two Boston-area companies illustrate this KISS (Keep it
simple, Sid) concept.
• Embo-Optics, LLC, based in Beverly, Massachusetts, has
successfully raised startup capital from friends and fam-
ily and angel investors.The company identified an easy-
to-understand problem: Military personnel frequently
need to give wounded soldiers intravenous drugs in the
dark. Many battles take place at night and traditional
lighting is either unavailable, or its use would give away
the soldiers’ position to the enemy. Embo-Optics created
the Pin-Lite™, a small, disposable, pinpoint light that
clips onto a syringe and illuminates the patient’s vein to
allow easy and safe insertion of an IV line in low-light
conditions.
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• Carbonite, Inc., based in Boston, Massachusetts, has
raised money from friends and family, angel investors,
and more recently, from a venture capital fund.
Carbonite identified a problem faced by almost every
home computer user—the loss of precious family pho-
tographs and other data when a computer crashes.
Carbonite developed an on-line backup system that
automatically backs up a user’s computer to Carbonite’s
secure storage network without the need to copy pho-
tographs or files to CDs or other storage media.
Carbonite software works in the background whenever
the computer is on, and doesn’t require any input from
users after the initial setup.
“Further on Down the Road, You Will
Accompany Me . . .” 
This Taj Mahal classic song could be an anthem for investors
in today’s venture climate. Most financing sources expect
companies to be further down the road to profitability, or at
least to products, than during the financing “boom times” of
the past. Gone are the days when an internet (or other) start-
up can raise money on a concept alone. Demo products are
the rule; the easier the product is to “touch and feel,” the eas-
ier it is to raise money. As a result, founders are finding that
they need to devote more time, and more of their own (or
perhaps their family’s) money to the initial stages of product
development.
The ability of a financing source to observe a product
prototype can be the difference between a new investor for
the entrepreneur and a polite “no thank you.” Embo-Optics
was able to provide prospective investors with sample Pin-
Lite and other products, even though the production ver-
sions of the products would ultimately change somewhat.
Similarly, Carbonite was able to provide potential investors
with a trial version of the product to back up photographs
on their home computers. The chance for investors to
touch and feel a product, and see how it works, can be
invaluable. In a classic case, when first getting started, snack
food maker Smartfoods reportedly dropped off big bags of
its popcorn at the homes of prospective investors with
nothing more than a request to “try it and let us know what
you think.” The result was a successful early stage financing
for the company.
At a minimum, the entrepreneur should let investors see
how the product would work. If there is no prototype,a web-
site visualization can be a powerful tool. Drawings or pic-
tures also are helpful.The better job the entrepreneur does to
illustrate the product and its advantages to potential cus-
tomers, the easier it is for investors to understand. Can the
entrepreneur explain to his or her grandparents what the
venture is all about? If investors don’t appreciate how the
product works and why customers will buy it, chances are
good that they won’t invest. Most investors initially don’t
probe much, and if they don’t understand the product or
strategy, it becomes easy for them to simply say “no.”
Everything I Know about Starting a
Business, I Learned from Star Trek
First-time business founders are usually “true believers”—and
they need to be to have the determination,perseverance,and
commitment to get a new company off the ground and a new
product to market. But they are often driven by multiple
motives, such as the psychic satisfaction of “building a better
mousetrap,” solving a problem that has caused them person-
al hardship (not uncommon in startup medical device com-
panies), creating an “alternate working environment” or
“being their own boss.”Conversely, investors are single mind-
ed about a new investment opportunity: How will this busi-
ness make me more money tomorrow than I am investing
today?
Entrepreneurs need to recognize this dichotomy early on
if they hope to have any chance to raise growth capital suc-
cessfully.What does this mean in practical terms? Consider:
• Star Trek had “The Prime Directive”—don’t interfere in
another world’s business.The entrepreneur needs to be
equally single minded about the company’s goal. The
entrepreneur’s Prime Directive:The first and only goal is
to make money. Investors don’t care that a new medical
device will detect a particular disease sooner than cur-
rent competing products if no insurance company will
pay for the new test. Investors don’t care that a compa-
ny might be able to obtain patents in 35 countries to
protect its technology if that technology can’t be used in
a product someone will buy. In a technology company,
the goal is to turn science into money, not money into
science. Every decision the entrepreneur makes should
keep in mind the Prime Directive.
• The entrepreneur needs to be flexible about his or her
role in the business. If the entrepreneur is primarily a
“techie” who doesn’t have prior experience managing a
business, there must be acceptance that he or she might
not be the CEO of the company forever. The skills need-
ed to get a startup off the ground are very different from
those needed to grow a profitable business or manage a
more mature and more administratively complex com-
pany. Professional investors understand this and can
help the company grow, and help founders adapt to
changing roles. Entrepreneurs need to demonstrate the
willingness to change their roles as the company
grows—investors will generally turn down investment
opportunities where ego-driven founders insist in
advance on control of the company “no matter what,”
since this demand can easily get in the way of the Prime
Directive.
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• The cash-starved company should also demonstrate flex-
ibility when considering different forms of new invest-
ment.The company would be well advised to consider
all reasonable funding sources and to try to avoid biased
views. Even though, for example, it is true that Joe
“Bananas” Bonanno, head of one of New York City's five
crime families, listed his occupation as “venture capital-
ist,” that alone does not mean that all VCs are bad peo-
ple! Further, even if the company decides that it wants
to avoid the entanglements of a VC investment, it might
be beneficial to pitch the company’s story “off-
Broadway” to some “friendly” VCs. They can be a great
source of feedback to help the entrepreneur better
focus his or her fundraising efforts.
• The entrepreneurial team shouldn’t think about the
apocalypse.Too many founders spend time negotiating
provisions of investment documents that are a lawyer’s
parade of horribles—and which have little chance of
ever impacting the company. For example, venture cap-
italists often include a registration rights provision for
their shares that, taken at face value,would enable them
to “force” the company to go public.The practical reali-
ty is that no company can effectively undertake a pub-
lic offering without management’s cooperation, and
underwriters are rarely willing to include many shares
from existing shareholders in an IPO. Spending time
and legal fees arguing about these types of provisions
make the entrepreneur seem shortsighted, and can
make investors question the founder’s priorities and
business savvy.
“Location, Location, Location!”
Entrepreneurs—particularly those starting their first busi-
ness—too often focus on the wrong issues. Unlike the real
estate truism regarding “location,” financing a startup is not
all about “valuation,valuation,valuation.”Founders need to be
realistic about valuation, particularly during the early rounds
of financing with friends and family, angel investors, and ven-
ture capital firms.They also need to take the right steps—and
align themselves with the right advisors—to enhance their
chances of success. Some guidelines:
• First-time entrepreneurs should think long term about
the financing needs and business opportunities the com-
pany will face. Founders who focus on control and dilu-
tion,rather than on owning a smaller piece of a growing,
successful enterprise, will invariably choke off financing
for their companies. Professional investors and experi-
enced entrepreneurs recognize that rapid growth (need-
ed to beat the inevitable competition) requires substan-
tial resources and a talented team, both of which will
leave the founder with a smaller—but probably more
valuable—piece of the pie. A detailed discussion of
entrepreneurial control vs. value has previously been
discussed in this Practitioner’s Corner column (Levangie
2005).
• First-time entrepreneurs should also think long term
about their careers, and be prepared to give away more
of their first startup—it’s the price of entry into the
exclusive and rewarding club of serial entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs should think about hitting a single with
their first company, a double the next time, and home
runs with subsequent businesses.Raising capital is expo-
nentially easier for a seasoned, successful entrepreneur
than for someone starting a first business.
• To borrow from George Orwell’s Animal Farm, “All
dollars are equal, but some dollars are more equal than
others.” Family and friends may get you to the stage
where you can attract serious professional investors,
and may be the first necessary step for many startups.
But as choices develop, keep in mind the things your
investors can provide, and look for the so-called “smart
money.” Most venture capitalists, and many angel
investors, can provide access to high-level contacts
with potential customers, suppliers, joint venture part-
ners, and future sources of financing. Their circle of
business contacts can provide, for example, access to
joint venture participants or Chinese manufacturing
partners. Generally, Aunt Millie doesn’t offer the same
entrée to those parties.
• Choose your advisors well. Experienced outside direc-
tors, lawyers, accountants, and other business advisors
can provide introductions to potential financing
sources, as well as intermediaries who raise capital for
early-stage companies. The entrepreneur often needs
advice in problem solving from those who have success-
fully confronted the same problems in the past. But
beware of building an “artificial” board—having a “name
director” who doesn’t attend meetings or provide real
assistance won’t buy you much with financing sources,
especially if he or she hasn’t invested a meaningful
amount of money in the company. It’s far better to have
committed directors who can provide real product,mar-
ket, or industry experience, rather than a recognizable
but inactive board member.
How Much Is that Doggy in the Window?
The classic question every entrepreneur asks when starting
to raise capital: “What’s my company worth?”To determine
the answer, the entrepreneur could go back to that 50-page
Excel spreadsheet, look at the projected revenues and EBIT-
DA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amorti-
zation) in year 5, apply an assumed multiple to determine the
value of the company at that time, and apply a discount that
will yield the prospective investors’ hoped-for IRR (internal
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rate of return).Why not? It’s no less accurate than all of the
assumptions made in the plan about manufacturing and sell-
ing costs, achievable market share, and a myriad of other
items that go into preparing financial projections. Of course,
the calculus becomes more complex when one considers
that value/EBITDA multiples vary by market sector, as recent
values demonstrate below (Capital Q 2006):
• Telecon services and equipment: 11.5 X
• Technology hardware and electronics: 13.5 X
• Software: 34.0 X
• Pharma and biotech: 5.6 X
• IT services: 8.5 X
• Internet software and services: 13.7 X
• Healthcare equipment and services: 13.1 X
The reality is that one might as well stick a finger in the
wind, and see which way the breeze is blowing. Investors
have a herd mentality that is hard to break.The best indica-
tion of value is probably the price at which other local start-
ups and early-stage companies have raised capital, in most
cases regardless of the industry they have targeted. In round
numbers in the current venture market, the entrepreneur
might think about premoney valuations of $1.5 to $2 million
for friends and family financings, $3 to $5 million for angel
rounds, and similar or modestly higher premoney valuations
for seed round venture financings. Unscientific? Absolutely—
but practical.There are, of course, variations based on specif-
ic circumstances; for example, a company started by a suc-
cessful serial entrepreneur, or a company that has already
brought products to market and eliminated technical risk,
may command higher valuations.
The entrepreneur’s friends and family may be willing to
pay a higher price today (they may invest based more on
emotion than financial analysis).But if the venture overprices
this “friendly” investment, these friends and relatives are
bound to be disappointed when the angel or venture capital
investors in the next round insist on a lower valuation, and
they perceive that they have already “lost money.” If that hap-
pens, the entrepreneur’s family will still be “family,” but the
entrepreneur’s friends . . . ?
What’s Happening Now?—Angels vs. VCs!
In addition to some of the points discussed earlier, there are
some discernable trends in today’s market relating to angel
investors, venture capitalists, commercial lending, public
offerings, and other forms of entrepreneurial funding.
Angel Investors
Angel investors are increasingly banding together in groups
to evaluate potential investments.The advantage to startups
is that it is easier than ever to meet a number of angel
investors, who historically were hard to identify and contact.
The disadvantage: Like venture capitalists, angels have devel-
oped a sense of safety in numbers—if one or two angels in a
group pass on an investment, the rest may be inclined to do
the same.Like VCs,angels prefer certain market sectors.Willis
(2006) reports on a UNH study (Center for Venture Research,
Whittemore School of Business and Economics), which ana-
lyzed how 126,000 angels invested $11 billion in 26,000 ven-
tures during the first half of 2005.The allocation of funds was
distributed as follows:
• Health—20%
• Biotech—17.5%
• Software—17%
• IT services—13%
• Hardware—6%
• Semiconductors/networks—5%
• Financial services—4%
Angel investors are behaving like venture capitalists in
other ways as well, particularly within groups.Angel groups
do more extensive due diligence than in the past; valuations
closely track comparable venture capital valuations (see
above); and the group can offer help with industry and
financing contacts, and in recruiting additional management.
However,one study (VSS Project Angel Investors 2005) found
that angels are still more likely to invest in first-time entrepre-
neurs than are venture capitalists.
An increasing number of angel investors and/or financial
intermediaries (i.e.,“finders”) are putting together “one-off”
investment vehicles to invest in a particular company.While
this has the advantage to an entrepreneur of dealing direct-
ly with fewer investors, the structure tends to slow down
later financing rounds as the early investors try to minimize
dilution if they are not in a position to provide additional
financing.
There are several networking groups for angel organiza-
tions. Entrepreneurs can access the Angel Capital Association
(www.angelcapitalassociation.org), a nonprofit organization
that publishes a directory of investor groups on a regional
basis. Examples in the Boston area include Common Angels,
which claims 34 IPOs in its portfolio, and Launchpad Venture
Group, which invests $100 to $500 K in technology-driven
startups.
Venture Capital
On the face of it, venture capital funding seems to represent
the most fruitful source of financing. After all, there are
approximately 700 VC firms in the United States collectively
managing about a quarter of a trillion dollars (Anthony
2006)! The problem these VC firms have managing so much
money is that the risk-reward model is tempered by practical
limitations of deal size vs. the number of deals that can be
transacted.The attitude of VCs toward risk is becoming more
conservative.The big New England VC firms (e.g., Highland
Capital Partners, Greylock, Atlas, Polaris, Venrock, Advanced
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Technology Ventures) are typically investing in bigger deals
like Rib-X Pharmauticals (New Haven)—$50 Million—and
TagSys USA (Cambridge)—$35 million (Calnan 2006). As a
result, venture capital still remains a small minority of seed
round financings, representing less than 4 percent of all seed
financing in 2005, according to a PWC Money Tree survey, as
reported by Buckman (2006).
In 2005, aggregate investments by angels ($23 billion) and
venture capitalists ($22 billion) were roughly equal,but angel
dollars were spread over 49,500 earlier stage deals averaging
around $500,000 each, while VCs invested in just over 3,000
deals,most of them later stage investments averaging close to
$7 million each, as reported by the Angel Capital Educational
Foundation (2006).
During 2005, New England companies raised approxi-
mately $2.79 billion in 293 venture capital financings as
reported by Venture One (2006) The last five years show a
steady downward trend in the number of VC deals, and a lev-
eling off of overall dollars invested after a steep decline from
the highs of 2001:
• 2001 –  #  =  474  ($5.05 billion)
• 2002 –  #  =  358  ($3.02 billion)
• 2003 –  #  =  329  ($3.03 billion)
• 2004 –  #  =  314  ($2.81 billion)
• 2005 –  #  =  293  ($2.79 billion)
The terms of VC deals have changed somewhat in recent
times. Since transaction value has been trending upward,
there has been a movement toward “milestone investing,”
where funds are meted out based on the company’s attain-
ment of agreed on milestones.VC syndicates have borrowed
a poker term wherein venture capital financings have seen
“pay-to-play”provisions, where investors lose certain rights if
they do not participate in future rounds of financing, and
creep into “up rounds,” where the value of the company is
increasing. Historically, such provisions have applied only in
“down rounds,” where the value of the company has fallen
from the last financing. More overlays of complexity to give
the entrepreneur a headache!
Current “Hot Buttons”—A Green Example
Anecdotal evidence suggests that “Renewable energy in ‘06 is
the dot-com of ‘99,” with $3 of investment funds chasing
every $1 of potentially viable opportunities. Included in the
“green” case histories are:
• Konarka Technologies Inc. (Lowell, Massachusetts), with
$20 million from its recent round of VC funding, has
developed carbon nano-tubes to capture solar energy to
convert to electric power (Regan 2006).
• WindTechCo in Freetown, Massachusetts, is selling small
windmills for homeowners’ backyards.
• The city of Burlington,Vermont, has completed the first
hydrogen fuel station in New England, producing hydro-
gen from wind power and using the hydrogen to fuel
hybrid vehicles.
• The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative has its
Sustainable Energy Economic Development (SEED) ini-
tiative, and in 2006 made $1.4 million in loan grants to
Seahorse Power, maker of solar-powered trash com-
pactors; Premium Power Corp, maker of fuel cells;
Agrividia Inc, a biomass products company; and
Stellaris, a developer of solar films.
• Other regional fuel cell companies attracting capital
include Nuvera Fuel Cells (Billerica, Massachusetts),
Acumentrics (Westwood, Massachusetts), and Fuel Cell
Energy (Danbury, Connecticut).
• Boston-based RockPort Capital Partners raised in 2006 a
$261 million venture fund (Galante 2006) to invest in
“clean energy” and environmentally friendly products,
materials, and technologies.
Stay tuned to see if this latest of the venture market’s hot
areas continues, even as oil and gas prices continue to fall.
There Are Alternatives—You Can Take That
to the Bank (or Not)
The good news is there are more banks lending to young
companies, as well as an increasing number of nonbank ven-
ture lenders who provide debt financing. Given the entry of
new players into this market—both bank and nonbank—
over the past several years, debt financing for growing busi-
nesses is somewhat more readily available than in the past. In
addition, competition has, in many cases, brought down the
premium above the prime rate charged to smaller customers,
although most such loans still involve warrants to purchase
the company’s stock, or other equity “kickers.”
The bad news is “smart money” still counts. Glen Mello,
senior vice president and regional manager of Square One
Bank, an active lender to startup companies, notes that most
bank lenders will consider prerevenue and preprofitability
loans only to companies that are backed by venture capital-
ists or other institutional investors. Those kinds of relation-
ships are key to a bank’s decision to lend to early-stage com-
panies.Nonetheless, entrepreneurs should plan ahead: When
choosing a bank for a startup, the entrepreneur should pick
one that will ultimately be a likely candidate to lend the com-
pany money as it grows, rather than the local branch of a sav-
ings bank that will never be a source of business financing.
The sooner companies can develop relationships with a bank
that can track their growth and progress, the more likely it is
for that bank to become a source of financing (or source of
leads to other investors) down the road.
Cries for Liquidity: “How Do We Get Our
Money Back?”—What Are the Options?
The range of options for achieving liquidity for investors is
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intriguingly broad and diverse; the choices perhaps difficult
to make. A simplified decision tree for the entrepreneur to
provide an exit position for the company’s investors might
include the following branches:
• Sell the company—a Merger & Acquisition (M&A) trans-
action.
• Pursue a conventional Initial Public Offering (IPO).
• Pursue an IPO on a overseas stock exchange.
• Execute an Alternate Public Offering (APO), or a variant
thereof.
Selling Out—New England M&A Activity 
Acquisitions have represented a frequent exit route for New
England-based, venture-backed companies. According to the
Venture One survey (2006),over the last five years, the region
has experienced the following activity:
• 2001—48  M&A deals
• 2002—52  M&A deals
• 2003—39  M&A deals 
• 2004—56  M&A deals
• 2005—64  M&A deals
The region produced two large M&A transactions involv-
ing Transform Pharmaceuticals and Imagitas—each for $230
million. With its access to private and university R&D, the
venture capital network, and the pool of technical and pro-
fessional talent, New England remains a center of entrepre-
neurial activity. Accordingly, larger companies are typically
drawn to the region seeking M&A transactions with smaller
entrepreneurial companies.
Rethinking the IPO Option
IPO activity for emerging companies continues to be quiet,
with only a relative handful of transactions in 2005 and 2006
compared to prior “boom” years. The market has been less
receptive. Dozens of IPO offerings in 2006 [e.g., Alien
Technology (bar code technology) and Go Daddy (Internet
address registrar)] have been “yanked.”The companies them-
selves are also less receptive. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and
other corporate governance reforms have made IPOs less
attractive as financing and exit vehicles for entrepreneurial
companies.
The Venture One data reflects the reluctance to “go pub-
lic.” The IPO activity for New England-based, venture-backed
companies has been as follow:
• 2001—1  IPO
• 2002—0  IPOs
• 2003—3  IPOs
• 2004—7  IPOs
• 2005—8  IPOs 
All the IPOs for 2004 and 2005 were in Massachusetts.
The 7 IPOs in 2004 were all in life sciences; the 8 IPOs in
2005 involved technology and life science companies.
The reasons for low IPO activity seem clear. The relative
burden on smaller companies of complying with SOX often
outweighs the perceived benefit of being a public company.
Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the average
annual cost of compliance for companies with under $1 bil-
lion in annual revenue has increased more than $1.8 million
to approximately $2.9 million, representing a 174 percent
overall increase (Foley and Lardner 2006). As a result, entre-
preneurs and their venture capital backers are more often
looking to a sale of the business as the preferred exit strategy.
Going Overseas—the AIM Option
Increasingly, smaller U.S. companies are considering an IPO
on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London
Stock Exchange, instead of a U.S. IPO.Two decades ago, the
two coauthors were involved in a successful London USM
(Unlisted Securities Market) IPO of a zero-stage Boston-area
company. The USM has since 1995 become the AIM.
Massachusetts companies such as online advertising broker,
Burst Media, and e-commerce software vendor, Elcom
International have opted for the AIM route.
Companies that list on a foreign market such as AIM gen-
erally escape the reach of Sarbanes-Oxley and other U.S.secu-
rities laws, subject to some exceptions (Broude 2006).
However, most shares of AIM-traded companies are held by a
limited number of institutional shareholders, with less activ-
ity from retail investors than U.S.markets. As a result, the AIM
market does not necessarily provide the liquidity for share-
holders that a U.S. listing provides. In many cases, an AIM IPO
financing may be a form of “public” venture capital.
Writing a “Blank Check”—the SPAC
Despite the high costs of being a public company,some small
and mid-size businesses continue to look at alternative ways
to attract public investors and to provide subsequent liquid-
ity for their early investors. Some raise capital by merging
with a SPAC (Special Purpose Acquisition Company).A SPAC
is a “blank check” company founded by a management team
that usually consists of former CEOs, investment bankers, or
fund managers. The SPAC has no initial business, instead it
raises money in an IPO and then looks for a business to
acquire. Some or all of the cash raised in the SPAC’s IPO can
then be used as growth capital for the combined companies.
Over the last three years, more than 65 SPACs have complet-
ed IPOs, and more than two thirds of those are still looking
for acquisition candidates. Currently, according to recent reg-
istration statements filed with the SEC, there are approxi-
mately 40 SPACs with a total of more than $3.8 billion look-
ing for companies to buy. Additional SPAC IPOs that are in
process could double that amount.
There are a host of practical considerations about a trans-
action with a SPAC:
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• Entrepreneurs can’t have any discussions with a SPAC
until it completes its IPO. SPACs must avoid such discus-
sions so that they are not required to disclose information
about a target acquisition in the prospectus for its IPO.
• The SPAC’s shareholders must approve any acquisition,
which tends to make transactions with SPACs take
longer than other forms of financing. In addition, up to
20 percent of the SPAC’s public shareholders can choose
to vote against the deal and obtain a refund of their
share of the proceeds of the SPAC’s IPO, which makes
the SPAC’s capital structure somewhat uncertain until
the deal is completed.
• A SPAC is essentially a shell with only part-time manage-
ment looking to acquire a company.As a result, the entre-
preneurial business acquired by a SPAC must be ready,as
soon as the deal closes, to become an SEC-reporting
company and comply with all of the SEC rules, including
Sarbanes-Oxley.
Playing the Old Shell Game—the APO
In a variation on this alternate financing theme, some compa-
nies have completed an Alternative Public Offering (APO),
which consists of a merger with a publicly traded shell com-
pany combined with a simultaneous PIPE (Private Invest-
ment in Public Equity) financing. A PIPE is a private place-
ment by a public company (in this case, by a newly public
company). In an APO,unlike a SPAC,the publicly traded merg-
er partner often has little or no cash,so the transaction makes
sense only if it is combined with the PIPE financing. Some of
these publicly traded shells are companies that failed in or
sold their original businesses, while others are new entities
that were specifically formed for the purpose of completing
an APO transaction.
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose
French writer Alphonse Karr (Les Guêpes, Paris, January 31,
1849) had it right: The more things change, the more they
remain the same. Raising capital for emerging companies
continues to be a long, time-consuming process that strains
an entrepreneur’s ability to balance the competing needs to
move the business ahead while wooing investors.
The relative availability of financing from various sources
and for various industries changes from year to year, influ-
enced by market trends, the current economic environment,
stock market conditions, and other factors unrelated to any
particular business. Outside directors and advisors can be
helpful in identifying current trends in financing opportuni-
ties and making introductions to the right sources.The key
for company founders is to stay focused on identifying and
pursuing a real opportunity where they have the ability to
seize market leadership.And, above all, remember the Prime
Directive!
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